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Abstract 
During the enlargement negotiations with the post communist states from CEE, the EU 
required sets of rules to be established creating independent administrations, judiciary, 
competition regulators and other key institutions. This article argues that the fate of these 
institutional rules adopted in response to the EU’s conditions for membership is an 
important, under-researched part of the post enlargement research agenda. The key 
question is whether informal rules and practices will also change following the change in 
formal rules and lead to institutionalization, or alternatively, whether the imported rules 
will be reversed or remain empty shells.  To account for divergent patterns of 
institutionalization, I propose a framework focusing on the preferences of key actors 
bargaining over the new institutions. I identify issue specific veto players and non-state 
actors linked to them as the key actors that will affect the outcome of the post 
enlargement round of bargaining over the new rules. 
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1. Introduction: EU rules in the new member states  
 
As the post communist states from Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) prepared to join the 
European Union (EU), economic restructuring and political and administrative reforms 
were synonymous with Europeanization. A few years after the last enlargement, some 
obvious cases of backsliding have taken place (World Bank, 2006), which have led 
observers to question whether EU driven reforms would last. Slovakia and Poland 
abolished their newly created Civil Service Authorities, The Czech republic postponed 
implementation of civil service reform (The Economist, 2006), and Poland slid down to 
the bottom of the European Commission’s transposition scoreboard (European 
Commission,  2009). Practical implementation of formally adopted EU policies in the 
new member states has also been question by analysts (Falkner and Treib, 2008). 
 
The EU has been successful in stimulating CEE states to introduce reforms while they 
were preparing for accession by setting reform objectives as conditions for membership. 
Consensus has emerged that EU conditionality has had a considerable impact – mediated 
by domestic institutions – on successful EU rule adoption in candidate states 
(Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2005). Conditionality, however, expired with CEE 
accession to the EU. The question arises, would reforms endure after conditionality?  Or, 
to paraphrase it in terms of the enlargement literature debate, would formal rule adoption 
lead to behavioural changes (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2005)? The new puzzle 
that defines a large part of the post enlargement research agenda is why the formal 
adoption of EU rules has led, in some cases, to real institutional and policy change and in 
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other cases to reversal or neglect ?  To address this puzzle, this article proposes a 
theoretical framework that shifts attention from international to domestic actors and their 
influence on the post accession institutionalization of formal EU rules. 
 
2. Beyond formal rules: defining institutionalization 
 
Before discussing the framework, I will define the central concepts of institutions, formal 
and informal rules and institutionalization. Consistent with a rational choice approach, 
institutions are defined here as a set of man-made rules guiding the behaviour of actors 
(Héritier, 2007:6). These rules are both formal and informal and together they comprise 
what Ostrom (1999:38) calls the ‘rules-in-use’, which define practices on the ground. 
Formal rules are written down and subject to third party resolution, while informal rules 
are neither written down nor subject to outside enforcement.  Informal rules, as Héritier 
has pointed out, can emerge in the daily application of a formal rule and can be of an 
efficiency increasing or distributive nature (2007:46). Institutionalization is, therefore, 
defined here as a process whereby a new formal rule is supported by supplementary 
informal rules (Helmke and Levitsky, 2004:728) and both become the new rules-in-use.  
 
To elucidate this further, it is important to point out what is not institutionalization. When 
new formal rules are introduced from a different arena, as is the case with EU 
enlargement, they can be challenged by actors or simply ignored, while other, informal 
rules define practices on the ground. If formal and informal rules remain different and do 
not align, institutionalization will not take place. In this case, the newly adopted formal 
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rules will remain rules-on-the-books rather than rules-in-use and will not affect the 
behaviour of actors. And vise versa, when formal and informal rules align together and 
are used by actors, we can speak of institutionalization of the new formal rules.  
 
This does not completely resolve the difficult question of how, in operational terms, we 
recognize an institution. The difficulty stems from the realisation that institutions are 
fundamentally shared concepts, existing in the minds of participants and therefore, in a 
certain sense, invisible (Ostrom, 1999:36-37). Ostrom suggests focusing on rules-in-use 
rather than the formal rules in order to identify the presence of an institution (1999:38). 
As research in rules-in-use is difficult to carry out on a large scale, I suggest an 
intermediary indicator for institutionalization, namely, the creation of supporting and 
supplementing rules. The supporting rules can be formal, such as secondary legislation, 
or informal, such as action plans, strategies or manuals.  
 
Two very different bodies of literature inspire and inform the framework proposed below. 
First, the discussion of institutionalization draws on the insights of scholars that identify 
the differences between formal and informal rules as a source of endogenous institutional 
change (Farrell and Héritier 2003; Héritier 2007). This approach is inspired by a 
distributional rational choice theory that sees institutions as the outcome of a power 
oriented bargaining process (Knight, 1992). Second, the conceptualization of pre-
accession reforms as EU rule adoption is consistent with the approach of studies of 
conditionality and Europeanization East (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2005).  
Bringing the two together, it is clear that institutional change conceptualized as the 
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interplay between formal and informal rules can be seen in a different light when 
analyzing EU enlargement. Whereas Farrell and Héritier (2003) and Héritier (2007) 
analyse a process where new institutions arise as a result of changes in informal rules that 
later are followed by changes in formal institutional rules, enlargement brings changes in 
formal rules which may later be followed by changes in informal rules. 
 
In empirical terms, the rules adopted during EU enlargement pertain to a broad range of 
issues related to specific policy areas, political, administrative and judicial processes and 
the setup and competences of state organizations (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 
2005:7). More specifically, candidate countries were required to adopt the Union’s acquis 
communautaire which mostly consists of rules harmonizing policies. In addition, specific 
conditions arose during the enlargement process, prescribing additional reforms: the 
‘enlargement acquis’. The latter aimed to strengthen the CEE democracies and markets 
by supporting administrative and judicial reform and the setting up of new bodies such as 
competition authorities. These conditions did not focus on a specific policy, but required 
the creation of a general institutional framework supporting the functioning of EU 
policies, defined by the European Commission as ‘institution building’ (Dimitrova, 
2002). 
 
Observers have not been very optimistic about the real impact of the adopted formal rules 
and many have suggested that the new legislation would exist only on paper, would 
remain ‘formal structures without substance’ (Bugaric, 2006). We do not, however, have 
sufficient empirical evidence to support the view that formal rule adoption would not be 
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followed by behavioural adoption. Theoretically, we can expect that the EU rules which 
have been created for a different set of preferences and economic conditions and have 
been ‘exported’ to candidate states, may not fit with the preferences of domestic actors or 
domestic economic conditions. Furthermore, departing from a power distributive rational 
choice approach, we can expect that, given a choice between different rules in 
implementation procedures, actors would seek to find the rule that maximizes their 
influence (Héritier, 2007:50) Therefore, post conditionality, we can expect that domestic 
veto players and their preferences would determine the shape of the new rules. 
 
Therefore, the framework outlined below uses an actor based approach that takes into 
account external monitoring and the weak state environment in CEE states in order to 
explain the variation in institutionalization of formal rules. The framework builds on the 
power distributive rational choice approach as well as on research on post communist 
weak states and on EU policy implementation.  
 
The process of institutionalization I focus on here is clearly similar to processes of 
implementation which have been studied extensively in the public policy literature. The 
main difference between implementation and institutionalization as conceptualized here 
is that the former examines rules related to policies and the latter rules related to 
institutions. 2 Even though the terms can be used interchangeably, it is important to give 
separate attention to the fate of institutional sets of rules as they have considerable impact 
as institutional foundations for the implementation of the acquis. 
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This article will proceed as follows: in the next section I will explore existing research on 
CEE reforms ‘post conditionality’ as well as the broader implementation literature and 
establish to what extent they can identify factors that can influence institutionalization.  
Next, I will argue that a perspective that emphasizes the weak post communist state and 
its specific constellation of actors can explain better institutionalization dynamics.  In the 
following sections, I will outline the framework focusing on the role of domestic actors 
that determine the fate of the new institutions and specify potential outcomes and 
hypotheses for further research. 
 
3. Perspectives on implementation from the Europeanisation literature 
 
Before addressing the question why some formal rules adopted pre-accession do not 
become institutions, but remain only law-on-the-books, it is useful to draw attention to 
what is missing in the existing scholarship on post accession adoption of EU rules. I turn 
first to contributions which focus on the new member states and then to broader insights 
from Europeanization and implementation literature. Several key points summarize the 
insights from this research and illustrate the need for seeking further theoretical 
explanations for the puzzle outlined above: 
 
• The mechanisms underlying pre-accession conditionality, namely social learning 
or external incentives, are expected to influence the fate of the new rules, yet 
limited empirical evidence of rule transfer through social learning makes this 
approach difficult to use. 
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• Studies of post accession adoption of EU rules shed light mostly on transposition, 
that is, the formal adoption of EU rules, but do not explain institutionalization 
beyond this point. 
• The broader implementation literature stresses the importance of domestic 
administrative traditions as filters for EU rules, but domestic administrations in 
post communist states are in flux. 
 
Conditionality and Europeanization East 
It seems logical when following the fate of the EU rules adopted by candidate states 
under the influence of conditionality to examine the mechanisms which underpinned 
conditionality and facilitated rule transfer. If the adoption of EU rules by domestic actors 
is influenced by social learning or the social context (Epstein, 2008), then we can expect 
that compliance with these rules would last beyond conditionality. Such a post-
conditionality approach has been proposed by several scholars (Sedelmeier 2006; 
Epstein, 2008; Pridham, 2008). Sedelmeier (2006:157) argues that when rules have been 
adopted by social learning they would have a broader societal base and can be defended 
against political actors who challenge them. Pridham (2008) uses a similar theoretical 
framework to study post accession compliance with EU political standards in Latvia and 
Slovakia. There are, however, serious methodological difficulties of specifying a priori 
observable implications of social learning. Another problem is the lack of sufficient 
empirical evidence of pre-accession cases of rule transfer through social learning 
(Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2005). 
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Transposition as formal rule adoption 
Several scholars investigating the fate of reforms after accession have focused on the 
transposition of directives by the new member states. The rate of transposition of 
directives is a useful measure of the level of adoption of formal EU policy rules.  
 
Sedelmeier’s analysis of the record of the new member states shows that they have not 
slowed down their efforts to adopt EU directives in the first post-accession years (2008: 
822). Another study of transposition of EU directives in the new member states, 
combining Commission data and case studies (Toshkov, 2008, 2009) reaches the same 
conclusion. Based on Sedelmeier (2008) and Toshkov’s work (2008, 2009), we can say 
that the new member states have continued to adopt the European Union’s formal policy 
rules into their legislative systems. These studies provide important insights in post 
accession compliance, but do not say much about institutionalization or implementation 
beyond the formal rules.  
 
Administrative capacity 
Several pre-accession studies identify administrative capacity in a broader sense, 
including institutional rules, civil service systems and financial resources as the key 
factors influencing the success of CEE in adjusting to EU requirements (Verheijen, 
2000). In-depth research of Poland’s enlargement preparations by Zubek (2005, 2008) 
reaches conclusions that stress the importance of institutional capacity and political 
coordination for timely transposition. Hille and Knill (2006) found that the transposition 
of the acquis in the candidate states was a question of bureaucratic capacity to carry out 
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administrative reforms. Their focus, however, was on the pre-accession period when veto 
players played only a small role (Dimitrova 2002; Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 
2005), a situation which has changed post accession as the incentive of membership 
expired.   
 
Research by Falkner et al (2005:302) also highlights the significance of capacity in terms 
of administrative and financial resources. The conclusions of their implementation study 
in the EU-15 member states include capacity as an important factor. Falkner et al 
conclude that the national cultures of responding to adaptation requirements create 
patterns of implementation (2005:319). These patterns create several ‘worlds of 
compliance’ in which different factors and variables play a role. A study of the new 
member states by Falkner and Treib (2008), focusing on social policy directives, 
concludes  that they exist in a world of ‘dead letters’ where formal rules do not get 
implemented in practice. This research addresses a question similar to the central 
question of this article, but deals with only one policy area. Furthermore, their framework 
implies strong country specific patterns in implementation (Treib, 2007), while the 
Commission’s scoreboards show that CEE’s transposition record varies considerably 
across sectors (see also Toshkov, 2009), which provides a strong argument for seeking 
further explanations. 
 
Europeanization 
Last but not least, issues of implementation have been extensively explored by the vast 
literature on Europeanisation. A key insight that emerges from this literature is the 
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importance of veto players, their preferences and configuration (Haverland, 2000). 
Steunenberg (2006) developed a model that identifies political and administrative actors 
whose configuration and preferences influence the transposition of EU directives. 
Following this work, political and administrative actors will be identified as the important 
veto players whose preferences shape institutionalization. 
 
Numerous Europeanization studies have also identified domestic administrations and 
administrative traditions as key factors filtering the transmission of EU rules in the 
Union’s member states (Knill, 2001). There are, however, good reasons why these studies 
are lacking when we try to explain post accession dynamics in CEE. Administrative 
traditions as explanations are rooted in West European context of institutional stability, 
but the core state institutions in the CEE states have been in profound transformation 
after the collapse of communism. In the next section, I argue that it is this state of 
transformation that should be taken into account if we want to understand the conditions 
under which new institutions may take root.  
 
4. Weak state, strong actors: the post communist context  
 
The institutional rules promoted by the EU during the accession negotiations aimed to 
establish competition authorities, independent civil services, anti discrimination 
commissions. The importance of such rules for good policy implementation is obvious. 
More importantly, however, these institutions themselves need a strong state framework 
in order to function.  
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Post communist states, however, as the literature on this topic agrees, are weak states that 
have been, since the collapse of communism, in transformation. As Grzymala-Busse and 
Jones Luong argue, they have been engaged in the project of creating new legal orders, 
impartial bureaucracies and networks of market regulation (2002: 529-530). The need to 
re-construct public authority, to re-build the state, has been the real common denominator 
across Central and Eastern Europe. 
 
There has been a staggering failure of the early scholarship on democratization to 
appreciate the role of the state for successful reforms after communism. The subsequent 
shift in scholarly attention defined several aspects of the weak state which are relevant for 
the framework developed here. First, the process of state building can be conceptualized 
as a competition over institutions between post communist elites (Grzymala-Busse and 
Jones Luong, 2002:537).  
 
Second, this process or reconstruction of public authority has as a consequence a 
weakened ability to implement policy visions and regulate society (Migdal, 1988, 
Krastev, 2002). When the state is too weak to support institutional rules with sanctions or 
administrative resources, the newly adopted EU rules are likely to remain ‘dead letters’. 
Such a mechanism of failure would be consistent with the findings of Falkner et al (2008) 
- sometimes the administrations they studied did not have the resources to implement and 
enforce the new rules. 
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Thirdly, when state institutions are weak, informal networks emerge to take over some of 
their functions. As Lake and Powell suggest, the density and quality of existing 
institutions has a positive influence on the informational structure for bargaining between 
actors (1999:8). Such informational advantages are lost when state institutions do not 
function properly. Networks of any kind in which actors might participate are then 
especially important – as alternative means for providing information. The informal 
networks that have emerged after the collapse of communism privilege some actors and 
disadvantage others in the renegotiation of the new rules (Ganev, 2007). 
 
Fourth and linked to the previous, non-state actors have considerable influence on the 
further course of reforms and the state. Hellman has identified the early winners as veto 
players obstructing further reform and change: “Actors who enjoyed extraordinary gains 
from the distortions of a partially reformed economy have fought to preserve those gains 
by maintaining the imbalances of partial reforms over time” (Hellman 1998:233). 
Ganev’s analysis (2007) sheds light on the actual mechanisms whereby early winners 
undermined not only further reforms, but also the state. He describes a two stage process 
of a clash between state agencies and (former communist) elite networks. These networks 
first ‘join’ forces with state agencies to transfer public assets and later clash with them 
when the state tries to reassert control (Ganev 2007). Thereby, they weaken the state and 
deprive it of assets, which it needs to support democratic governance. 
 
This work has shed light on the early stages of post communist transformation, after 
which, post communist states have reasserted some of their control. However, it does not 
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require a great leap of the imagination to assume that networks which have come together 
to take advantage of state assets would attempt to capture the distribution of EU funds 
next. Institutionalization of the rules promoted by the EU has the potential to become the 
next arena for contestation for post communist entrepreneurs, especially when the 
institutions involved have distributive implications. 
 
5. Institutionalization as political bargaining 
 
Based on the above, I argue that different outcomes in the institutionalization of EU 
driven formal rules would be determined by the competition of actors that bargain over 
institutions in a weak state environment.   
 
According to this framework, institutionalization would depend on the configuration and 
relative bargaining power of actors relevant to a certain new set of rules. To define the 
framework, I will discuss first the competition/bargaining aspect and then the relevant 
actors. State weakness is viewed as a strategic environment for this bargaining that, 
through the presence of networks, allows considerable influence of non-state actors on 
political decision-making that would reverse, support or neglect the new formal rules. 
 
Before proceeding, it is important to clarify my expectation that the new rules adopted 
during enlargement preparation would be reviewed after accession. Examples of 
backsliding in reforms cited above suggest that, after enlargement governments can be 
tempted to reverse pre-accession reforms. Secondly, the speed with which candidate 
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states transposed vast amounts of EU rules at the pre-accession stage has led to little 
political and societal debate on their implications. Some rules needed to be changed to be 
adapted better to societal conditions. Thirdly, the strength of conditionality during 
accession negotiations was such that veto players did not play a role, but sometimes they 
tried to improve their position at the implementation stage. Focusing on implementation 
proper as opposed to adoption of formal rules, even in older member states the process 
has been shown to have different stages. Lang’s (2003) study showed that some member 
states would first adopt structural funds rules consistent with Commission requirements 
and then isolate them, continuing to operate according to different, informal rules. 
 
Thus, the institutionalization of previously adopted EU rules would be the outcome of 
another round of strategic bargaining of actors competing to shape institutions around the 
new formal rules. To identify the relevant actors I follow Steunenberg (2006), who 
suggested that the number of veto players in transposition of EU directives would depend 
on the sectoral or issue area configuration. Thus, the actors relevant for 
institutionalization are politicians and members of the administration. In the weak state 
environment, another group, non-state actors, linked to government through informal 
networks, can also be expected to play an important role.  
 
Usually, veto players are identified in the literature by their position in the formal 
configuration of the political system (Tsebelis, 2002). However, as Grzymala-Busse and 
Jones Luong (2002:533) suggest, the institutional location of crucial actors in the post 
communist context cannot be assumed, but may vary from country to country and is 
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influenced by both formal and informal practices. As discussed above, veto players - for 
example political parties – are linked, through networks, with powerful non-state actors 
that become informal veto players. We already have some empirical evidence how such 
non-state actors use their access to state structures to influence the institutionalization of 
the new rules: 
 
“In addition to capturing the top echelons of the executive power and the leadership of 
political parties, the oligarchs assign no lesser value on maintaining control over 
Members of Parliament, the state administration, and the court system. Such a nefarious 
symbiosis subsequently allows oligarchs to control state enterprises, to have access to 
unlimited lines of bank credit, to evade tax inspections, to “win” all their cases in court, 
to become beneficiaries of specially designed clauses in laws, etc” (Corruption 
Assessment Report, CSD, 2009) 
 
Such developments seem far away from the process of implementation of EU rules, but 
the discussion above shows that they are closely connected. Only by taking into account 
formal and informal veto players in a weak state setting can we explain the different 
outcomes in institutionalization. Furthermore, as the next section will argue, the nature of 
the rules adopted pre-accession also plays a role. 
 
6. Explaining different institutionalization outcomes 
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The variation in outcomes with respect to institutionalization of imported non-acquis 
rules is potentially larger than with regard to implementation of the acquis. Even after 
conditionality, the EU’s mechanisms for monitoring and sanctions can influence actors’ 
cost benefit calculations.  Rules which are part of the EU acquis would be more costly to 
reverse (see also Sedelmeier, 2006). The situation is, however, different with enlargement 
conditions promoting rules which had no basis in the acquis.  They can be reversed with 
relatively little cost. 
 
Next to reversal, organizational sociology literature suggests another possible outcome. 
Brunsson and Olsen (1997) have shown that organizations faced with external reform 
demands can create two parallel sets of structures of formal and informal rules and 
continue to operate according to the informal rules while keeping the formal rules for 
external requirements.  
 
Based on the above, three possible outcomes can be specified with regard to the adopted 
EU rules post accession3:  
• reversal of the new rules,  
• institutionalization (formal and informal rules align),  
• ‘empty shells’ (actors ignore the new rules, parallel informal rules are used) 
 
Based on the framework proposed above, several hypotheses can be formulated and 
tested as a way to account for these different post accession outcomes.  
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1. When adopted formal rules are part of the EU acquis, the most likely outcomes are 
institutionalization or empty shells.  
 
1.A When formal rules are part of the acquis, but the veto players preferences are against 
the new rules, two sets of rules will be established as parallel structures, leading to an 
‘empty shells’ outcome. 
 
2. When adopted formal rules are not part of the EU acquis reversal or 
institutionalization are equally possible based on the configuration of preferences of veto 
players. 
 
2A. When adopted non-acquis rules are opposed by veto players, they will be reversed. 
 
3. When veto players’ preferences are configured in such a way that the new rules are 
preferable to the status quo, the old and new rules would align and there would be 
institutionalization. 
 
We can already point to some evidence of all of the expected outcomes materializing, 
suggesting interesting possibilities for further research. As mentioned above, civil service 
legislation in several new member states has been amended, reversing the principles of 
civil service independence promoted by the EU (Meyer-Sahling, 2006). Research in 
progress by Dimitrova and Steunenberg has identified the existence of parallel sets of 
formal and informal rules in the area of cultural heritage in Bulgaria. Further comparative 
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research should aim to identify different constellations of actors in other sectors and 
countries to test the hypotheses proposed here.  
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1 An earlier version of this article has appeared as 'Institutionalization of imported rules in the European 
Union's new member states: Bringing Politics back into the research agenda', RSCAS working paper 
2007/37, EUI , Badia Fiesolana. 
2 Some examples can make this distinction clearer: when the rules pertain to policies, we can speak of 
implementation, e.g. the implementation of directives on working time. When the adopted rules pertain to 
institutions - e.g. independence of the civil service – I speak of institutionalization.    
3 Other authors have also discussed potential outcomes, especially reversal (Pridham, 2008), but from an 
external incentives perspective. The outcomes identified here are rooted in a domestic perspective. 
